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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the role that strategic planning plays in the evolution of
Command and Control (C2) systems by defining both C2 and strategic planning and
showing the interfaces between them. It goes on to show how the view of the threat
in the years to come influences the implementation of C2 systems. Furthermore, the
author challenges the traditional strategic thought on threat assessment which views
the threat primarily as a massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe or an all-
out Soviet nuclear attack. The future threat, projected ten to twenty years out is
examined and expanded to include more likely scenarios the U.S. military may face
including: drug trafficking, low intensity conflict in the Persian Gulf, and ballistic
missile proliferation. From these emerging threats, the author recommends what C2
system technology the Department of Defense (DOD) should pursue.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I shall repeat that as far as United States Foreign Policy is concerned, it is
based on a least two delusions. The first is the belief that the economic system
of the Soviet Union is about to crumble and that the USSR will not succeed
in restructuring. The second is calculated on Western superiority in
equipment and technology and, eventually, in the military field. These illu-
sions nourish a policy geared toward exhausting socialism through the arms
race, so as to dictate terms later. Such is the scheme; it is naive. [Ref. l:p.
206]
A. BACKGROUND
In his recent book Perestroika, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev laid out his
plan for the restructuring of the Soviet Union. He states; "Perestroika is an urgent
necessity arising from the profound processes of development in our socialist society"
[Ref. l:p. 1] The Soviet Union has begun a course that would have been unheard
of as little as ten years ago. The emphasis of his new policies is the "broad
democratization of all aspects of society". [Ref. l:p. 18] With new developments in
Soviet policies, the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and the transformation
of the international system, the United States is being challenged to shed the "evil
empire" image of the Soviet Union.
With so much change taking place in the international environment, the
Western world including the U.S. is having to reevaluate its present foreign policy.
How should we interpret these changes? What effect should this have on defense
planning in the U.S. and with our allies? How will this affect our present military
1
strategy? Will Gorbachev succeed with his policy of perestroika? If he fails, what
will be the impact? Will the Soviet Union be the only principal threat in the next
ten to twenty years? So many questions remained unanswered.
The way we answer these questions is going to determine our national and
military strategies. Military strategies will determine force structures, weapon
systems and tactics, which in turn will determine our Command and Control (C2)
systems. The rapidly changing environment is proving to be an exciting but difficult
challenge for our military planners. Our long range strategic planners are having to
seriously reevaluate the possible futures ten to twenty years from now.
One can conclude that strategic planning has a great impact on the evolution
of Command and Control (C2) systems. How we see the threat ten to twenty years
from now will determine the types of weapon systems, force structures, and C2
systems we will develop. It is imperative that C2 system planners be intimate with
the strategic planning world. With the trend of reduced detense budgets, it is going
to be necessary to plan as prudently as possible and field those C2 systems which are
cost effective and can be functional in many types of environments.
Present U.S. strategy is geared toward a total war concept with the Soviet
Union in the European theater. This threat, though always present, does not appear
to be the most likely scenario in the next ten to twenty years. Much is predicated
on the success or failure of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's policies. Independent
of Gorbachev's success or failure the trend towards U.S. involvement in Low
Intensity Conflict (LIC) continues to mount. The Soviet Ution outcome will only
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add complexity to the LIC scenarios, but the fact remains that this level of warfare
remains to be reckoned with by military planners.
Other nations are expected to rise in military status in the next two decades.
Many smaller nations including Third World nations will have highly lethal accurate
munitions in their arsenals including nuclear weapons. The international environ-
ment is changing rapidly along with our national interests. United States interests
have shifted in recent years from being largely Euro-centered to reflect our growing
interdependence with other regions. [Ref. 2:p. 4] Military planners responsible for
fielding future C2 systems need to look seriously at expanding their view beyond the
"conventional war with the Soviet Union on European soil" to a more realistic view
of LIC in other areas of the world.
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This thesis addresses the role that strategic planning plays in the evolution of
Command and Control system technology. It shows how the view of the world
(threat) in years to come influence the C2 systems we field. The following
questions will be addressed:
" What is the role of strategic planning in the evolution of C2 systems?
" What will be the most likely threats in ten to twenty years (2000-2010-)?
* What type of C2 system technology should we pursue to meet the future
threat?
In Chapter 11, Command and Control (C2) will be defined. Some basic
fundamental concepts of C2 will be explored including the C2: process, system,
3
system architectures, and requirements. A cursory view of some fielded C2 systems
will be looked at to determine the dominate strategic thought guiding the
implementation of those systems.
In Chapter III, Strategic planning will be defined with emphasis on the major
components. Two ,-ategic planning models will be looked at to examine the
process and see the functional relationships between the major components. Futures
research will be explored in Chapter IV with a survey of the methods available to
the planner for developing alternative futures.
Chapter V will take a look into the future (2000-2010). There will be a brief
look at U.S. interests and their impact on the military. The international
environment will be examined to see what emerging threats will have the most
impact on the U.S. military. Chapter VI will then project the type of military force
which will be in place and recommend what C2 systems technology the U.S. should
pursue to meet the emerging threats outlined in Chapter V. Chapter VII will be the
conclusion.
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II. FUNDAMENTALS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and Control (C2) is a concept that continually takes on new
meaning. In its most basic form it is a process. C2 systems are designed with an
understanding of the process. C2 systems can be further defined in an architectural
sense. A C2 system requirement is developed to achieve a capability or fill a
deficiency to accomplish an approved mission. This chapter will explore
fundamental C2 concepts including the process, system, system architectures and
requirements. Several current C2 systems will be examined to discern what key
threats drove those requirements.
A. BASIC COMMAND AND CONTROL CONCEPTS
1. Command and Control (C2)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 (JCS Pub 1) provides a good solid
definition of command and control.
Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the
mission. [Ref 3:p. 77]
The concept of C2 is nothing new. The problem of commanding and controlling
armed forces...is as old as war itself. [Ref 4:p. 1] Command can be further defined
as the "authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over
subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment." [Ref 3:p. 76] The term control refers
to:
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those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces,
the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative
direction necessary to accomplish the mission...[Ref 3:p. 262]
Individuals have tried to change the meaning of the definition by adding
new variables. As years pass, new letters are added to the acronym. C2 was first
expanded to become C3, adding communications to the term; C3, adding
intelligence; C41, adding computers; and C412, adding interoperability, etc.. The
additional terms are many times added to C2 because of parochial interests of those
involved with communications, computers, or intelligence. In the Army,
communications and intelligence are not viewed as separate from, but integral to
command and control. [Ref 5:p. 59] For the purposes of this thesis C2 will be the
acceptable term. Any mention of C3, C3, C41, or any other combination will be
those of referenced material.
2. Command and Control System
It is important that a C2 system be defined properly. According to JCS
Pub 1, a C2 system consists of the following: the facilities, equipment,
communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning,
directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions
assigned. [Ref 3:p. 77]
The C2 system should be looked at as an entity. Communications, personnel,
equipment, etc.. are all essential items, however they are only a part of the C2
system, they do not stand alone. Communications continue to be at the forefront
today because of the great advances in technology and it is something tangible.
6
Command and control is not tangible, but a radio is. Communications are part of
the big picture (system).
Central to the C2 system is the commander. The operational military
commander is not merely the user of a C2 system, he is very much a part, if not the
dominant element of the C2 system. [Ref 6:p. 111-6] The C2 system should be
designed to fit the commander like a glove. The ideal command and control system
supporting a commander is such:
that the commander knows what goes on, that he receives what is intended for
him, and that what he transmits is delivered to the intended addressee, so that
the command decisions are made with confidence and are based on
information that is complete, true, and up-to-date. [Ref 7:p. 12]
Personnel including the commander, his subordinate commanders, and
staff are often neglected in the design of C2 systems. Technical people tend to look
at whizbang gadgets available for use in C2 systems rather than the whole
complicated feedback control loop which includes human beings. [Ref 8:p. 15] How
well the individual fits into the C2 system must be given ample consideration. C2
systems are unique, because the personnel and procedural aspects of a C2 system
require complete integration of the human element into system design criteria,
something not required of any other kind of system. [Ref 6:p. 111-6]
To better understand a C2 system with its integrated components, a
parallel can be drawn with the human body system.
With the body, sensors (eyes, ears, nose, fingers, etc.) receive stimuli and the
nervous system transmits this to the brain which makes decisions. Then the
commands to take action are relayed via the nervous system, from the brain
to the limbs. Thus sensors such as radars send information over
communication systems to the command center (brain) where commanders
make decisions and disseminate the decision back (over the nervous system)
to the combat forces (the hands, the fists, the punch). The system of C3 must
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be kept in balance to have an effective fighting force, just as the living system
must stay in balance to function properly. [Ref 7:p. 33]
In this example a process is taking place. Information is retrieved from
the environment. Decisions are made based on that information and disseminated
through the proper channels to the appropriate objects. This is an example of a C2
system functioning within the boundaries of a process.
3. Command and Control Process
C2 is a process. Even though computers and advanced communications
are something recent, the process of command and control is nothing new. The C2
system is designed with an understanding of the process. One of the most accepted
models to describe the C2 process is "Lawson's C2 Process Model" [Ref 9:p. 25].
The sense function corresponds to all data-gathering activities (radar sites,
forward observers, photo reconnaissance systems). The process function acts upon
these signals to attempt to extract meaning from them. External data, not directly
from the environment may be fused with the sensed information to get a clearer
picture. The compare function "ompares the state of the environment, as
determined by reports from the process function, with a desired state as specified by
some external source. The commander would most likely specify the desired state.
Based on this comparison, the decide function determines what should be done to
move the actual state to the desired state, and the Act function executes that






A commander's goal is to make decisions with certainty in the process.
The more uncertain the environment, the more risk involved with the decision. His
objective is to reduce the uncertainty about the environment in order to make the
best decisions. Most analysts contend that more information will bring greater light
on the environment and enable commanders to make better decisions. Others see
paradoxes emerging from this phenomena.
Sophistication and volume of information transmission may be inversely
proportional to, or irrelevant to, what actually is needed in crisis or combat,
that is, command information may be demanded or generated on the basis of
anxiety rather than function. [Ref 10:p. 54]
The responsibility of the commander is to take the enormous amount of
information and extract what is pertinent to his mission. He must have a good
understanding of his C2 system and use it to enhance the C2 process. A good
commander will recognize that he is in control and not the system, and that the
system is there to aid him, not run the show. Some contend that today's C2 systems
have not enhanced the C2 process.
Present day military forces, for all the imposing array of electronic gadgetry at
their disposal, give no evidence whatsoever of being one whit more capable of
dealing with the information needed for the command process than were their
predecessors a century or even a millennium ago. [Ref 4:p. 2651
A good understanding of the process is required to enable designers to develop the
best C2 systems possible.
B. C2 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES
In order to build a C2 system, one must understand system architectures. A
C2 system architecture is developed to provide a framework for the C2 system to
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support the C2 process. The conceptual design of a system often is referred to as
the architecture of the system. [Ref ll:p. 67] A C3 architecture is the arrangement
of (or process of arranging) the basic elements of a C3 system into an orderly system
framework. [Ref 12:p. 81] Again, from JCS Pub 1 a "C2 system" consisted of
"facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel". [Ref 3:p. 77]
More specifically, the elements may include "processing resources, storage media,
displays/man-machine interface units, data, system and application software,
operational procedures and personnel." [Ref 12:p. 82] It is the responsibility of the
system designer to arrange those in an orderly manner to best serve the commander.
Commanders must be involved with the design of their architecture and "know
the architecture or structure of the generic approach to the C3 process or system for
the type of force they command." [Ref 12:p. 81] The conceptual framework from
which they work includes "the C3 mission, physical environment, control and flow of
information, and representation, interpretation and transformation of information."
[Ref ll:p. 68] Problems arise when the system designers get focused on all the high-
tech communications equipment available and relinquish the role of mission in
designing the architecture. A former commander of a major Service material
command indicated:
The services focus on buying things, i.e., on obtaining systems at the
hardware/software level(such as radar systems and communications systems)
not mission systems like defending the CONUS against air and missile attack
or locating and killing enemy tanks in the which the C2 capability involved
needs to interface with weapons, platforms, and other C31 systems to some job.
[Ref 6:p. III-13]
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The complexity of C2 systems demands that many people get involved with the
design. The architects should be "the military analysts, planners, researchers and
users working together to design an integrated C3 structure that will support a
specific military force under anticipated battle situations and conditions." [Ref 12:p.
82] To design a system architecture based solely on the technology available will not
cut it in today's fast changing environment. One can begin to understand why the
strategic planners should be involved in the designing of the architecture. Mission,
future threat, and resource constraints are key ingredients in the design.
In order to design an architecture, a generic framework must be developed.
This has been very difficult. The 1987 Defense Science Board Task Force on C2
System Management pointed out that in "tactical and theater command and control
systems worldwide" there exists "a continuing absence of an agreed-upon, well
understood DOD architecture framework with its well defined interfaces and
standards..." [Ref 7:p. 12] Integrating all the elements of the C2 system has grown
to be complex with the explosion in computer technology. To understand the inter-
dependencies the system architecture must be broken down into simpler elements.
An overall architecture can be subdivided into three distinct sub-architectures:
organizational, functional, and physical.
1. Organizational Architecture
An organizational architecture is simply the structure of the organization.
It delineates the chain of command showing who is responsible for what task. The
organizational chart depicts the architecture. The design of an organization is
dependent on many things but the main driving force is the mission. Other variables
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in the design would include resources, the threat, physical and organizational
technologies. The "one best way" approach has dominated our thinking about
organizational structure since the turn of the century. [Ref 13:p. 276] But is there
a "one best way" of organizing? Recent management theory has moved away from
the "one best way" approach, toward an "it all depends" approach, formally known
as "contingency theory." [Ref 13 :p. 277]
The "it all depends" approach is based on the premise that "structure
should reflect the organization's situation-for example, its age, size, type of
production system, the extent to which its environment is complex and dynamic."
[Ref 13:p. 277] The environment is dynamic and will give cause to changes in
organizational structure. This is especially true in military organizations as the
threat continues to change. In developing or changing the organizational structure
to satisfy the mission, the designers must consider such things as what are the key
coordinating mechanisms, how much standardization should be built into the tasks,
should command be centralized or decentralized? The answers to these questions
will set into place the organizational architecture. From the organizational
architecture the functional architecture can be developed.
2. Functional Architecture
A functional architecture is developed by taking the various mission areas
in the organizational architecture and decomposing them into their specific functions.
Functional analyses serve as tools for defining areas of functional agreement,
identifying functional requirements, determining interfaces among system
components, highlighting system issues, and providing a basis for performing
system trades and developing candidate architectures. [Ref 14:p. 1]
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There are many functional analysis techniques available. Functional decomposition
being the primary one which decomposes primary functions into subfunctions at ever
increasing levels of detail. Other techniques which may be utilized include hierarchy
trees, flow charts, from/to charts, N2 charts, IDEF models and colored Petri Nets.
A specific function can be depicted by using a function box showing all the inputs,




Figure 2 Function Box
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A more specific example might be an artillery unit whose responsibility is to
put ordinance on target. There are several specific missions or tasks that must be
accomplished before the unit can begin firing on the target. The missions can be
functionally decomposed into areas such as sensing, processing, deciding and firing.
The mission of sensing is to sense the environment for possible targets. The
processing function takes the raw data extracted from the sensors and processes it
into usable form for the commander to make a decision to fire.
3. Physical Architecture
A physical architecture depicts the specific hardware systems and their
physical interrelationships. This would include C2 centers (headquarters),
information systems, communication systems and input sources (sensors, messages).
[Ref 11:p. 68] It provides a more detailed look at distinct communication links
between all the internal and external components that the C2 system must integrate
and interact with. It interconnects the various functions which were laid out in the
functional architecture to accommodate information flow.
Using the artillery example again. A physical architecture might include
a sensor which relays targeting information back to the decision maker (commander)
over a radio channel. The function to be performed is to fire on target. The sensor
provides the information via a radio link (medium) to the decision maker, a
computer processes the information, and the commander makes a decision to fire.
The architecture can be mapped to the C2 process (Lawson-Loop).
With the emerging threat requiring more joint operations, one can see
how it is important to have a robust, flexible, interoperable architecture in place.
15
The problem of interoperability between services has moved Congress to emphasize
jointness in the acquisition of C2 systems. Each service can no longer go out on
their own and purchase C2 systems without coordinating with the other. Those
involved with the developing of requirements and the acquisition of the systems to
satisfy the requirements have a challenging rad ahead.
C. DEVELOPING C2 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
One of the most difficult problems when working with C2 systems is defining
the requirement to meet the needs of the commander. A requirement is an
established need which justifies the allocation of resources to achieve a capability to
accomplish approved objectives, missions and tasks. The requirements process must
be balanced between the resources available, the technical capability and the
mission. The resources are constrained by Congress. The technical capability is
determined by the contractors. The mission is governed by such things as national
objectives and strategies, and the threat. What makes defining C2 system
requirements difficult is changes in:
threat to forces commanded, geography of the theater or type of forces
commanded, doctrine, rules of engagement, scenario, battle situation, status of
systems being controlled, and especially as commanders and/or their terms of
reference change. [Ref 6:p. 1-12]
When developing C2 system requirements, the planners must "define a
coherent set of long range goals, consistent with and strongly related to national
security strategy." [Ref 15:p.101 Some would contend that not enough thought is
given to national strategy when developing C2 system requirements:
First, I think we have to think more about national strategy, to learn its jargon
and the relationship of C3 to that strategy. Secondly, given the cause and
16
effect relationship, the effect of C3 systems on strategy and vice versa, we must
be very careful not to mislead either ourselves or those who make or
implement strategy decisions; mislead in the sense that we, or they, have too
rosy a view about the practical realities of what we can do with
communications, electronics, computers, etc.. [Ref 16.p. 101
A strand of fiber runs all the way through from national strategy to the technology
required to satisfy the requirement. It is imperative that the C2 system planners see
the many interfaces involved when developing the requirements.
The unique requirement of integrating the construct of hardware, software,
people and procedures to meet the needs of the commander requires a different
approach in the acquisition process. Several studies have proven that traditional
acquisition methods will not afford a quality C2 system.
C2 systems cannot be acquired successfully via the traditional approach,
wherein a detailed total system requirement and resulting total system
definition is established "up front," followed by development of the "total"
solution. [Ref 6:p. 111-4]
To remedy that problem an approach called evolutionary acquisition was developed.
Evolutionary acquisition is:
a system acquisition strategy in which only a basic or core capability is acquired
initially and fielded quickly, based on a short need statement that includes a
representative description of the overall capability needed and the
architectural framework within which evolution will occur. Subsequent
increments or blocks are defined sequentially, based on continuing feedback
provided from lessons learned in operational usage, concurrent evaluation of
adequacy of hardware/software configuration, and judgments of improvements
or increased capabilities that can result from application of new technology
where feasible. [Ref 6:p. 1-15]
Thus the system is built in blocks or phases allowing for future capabilities. Build
a little, test a little. This type of approach is convenient because it accommodates
such things as changes in the threat or mission. The requirements process is not a
one shot process, but rather a process that is done continuously. Each requirement
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must be seen in the "context of its individual contribution to the overall C31 solution
matrix in concert with companion systems." [Ref 17:p. xii]
D. A LOOK AT SOME CURRENT C2 SYSTEMS
The evolution of C2 systems is very much contingent upon the mission it is to
support. The mission is based on the threat, and our national and military
strategies. The objective of this section is to show that the predominant strategy
guiding the evolution of C2 systems is based on the strategic nuclear threat and the
conventional threat in Europe. When taking a cursory view of the C2 systems that
are fielded or in the process of being fielded, one can ascertain the threat and
military strategies that drove those requirements.
One of the key issues that has fueled significant growth in the expenditures for
C2 systems is the nuclear threat. The ever-present threat posed by nuclear war and
our policy of deterrence designed to prevent it have given a major impetus to the
dynamic evolution of C2. [Ref 18:p. 73] President Reagan's policies emphasized the
need for an enhanced C2 system to support the nuclear strategic mission. In
National Security Directive 91, President Reagan directed that the improvement of
command, control, and communications systems supporting our strategic forces be
the top priority. [Ref 19 :p. 30] The services took action to improve connectivity
from the sensors to the National Command Authority (NCA) and then to the
nuclear forces. "Improved coverage and sensor sur ivability for attack warning and
assessment, and enduring force management" [Ref 19:p. 30] were part of the
strategic modernization program.
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Some of the key systems to support the President's objectives were the "military
strategic/tactical and relay (Milstar) satellite system and the ground wave emergency
network (GWEN)." [Ref 19:p. 30]
The Milstar system will provide reliable, jam-resistant, survivable satellite
communications for tactical and strategic users. GWEN will provide
commanders of strategic forces with the ability to maintain critical continental
United States long-range command and control connectivity in both the trans
and post-attack phases of conflict. [Ref 19:p. 301
The priority of strategic C2 systems appear to remain at the top when it comes to
C2 system modernization.
Another phenomena that is driving the evolution of C2 systems is the
significance of the European theater in our military strategies. More money
continues to be poured into Europe to enhance the C2 infrastructure. General
Thurman Rogers noted
We have developed a tremendous network of interconnected C31 systems for
the European theater, but what happens when we are strategically deployed to
a crisis situation in an area of the world where Defense Communications
System (DCS) facilities are not available. [Ref 5:p. 58]
With US military strategy geared toward a war with the Soviet Union in the
European theater, the C2 systems to support that strategy have been given greater
attention.
Systems such as the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) and Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) are being
developed to strengthen our forces in NATO. JSTARS is an Air Force/Army
airborne radar and command and control system being developed to detect, track
and direct tactical weapons against stationary or moving ground targets from standoff
range. [Ref 19:p. 85] Its development is "motivated by the need for NATO force
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to be able to accurately apply conventional weapons at long range to halt, or deter,
a Warsaw Pact armored assault against Western Europe without crossing the nuclear
threshold." [Ref 19:p. 85] The JTIDS is a digital system that provides secure, jam-
resistant channels for transmitting data and voice communications. [Ref 19:p. 89]
The JTIDS is being designed to counter the existing electronic countermeasures
threat to US communications by Warsaw Pact forces. [Ref 20:p. 2]
E. SUMMARY
Command and Control is a concept that continually takes on new meaning.
In its simplest form it is a process. The C2 system is designed with an understanding
of the process. A C2 system architecture is developed to provide a framework for
the C2 system to support the C2 process. An architecture can be subdivided into
three distinct sub-architectures: organizational, functional, and physical. A C2 system
requirement is developed to achieve a capability to accomplish an approved mission.
These requirements must be "consistent with and strongly related to national security
strategy." [Ref 15:p. 10] Requirements must be acquired through an evolutionary
approach. C2 system planners must be familiar with the strategic planning process
to ensure that future systems will be functional in the most plausible future threat
environments. Chapter III will explore strategic planning in greater detail.
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Il. FUNDAMENTALS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
What we don't have today is the long term strategy and plans that will serve
as beacons for our decision makers and as our strategic direction for the future.
[Ref. 21:p. 23]
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a framework for the understanding of the strategic
planning process. Strategic planning is concerned with both the definition of goals
and objectives for an organization, and the design of the functional policies, plans,
and organizational structure and systems to achieve those objectives. [Ref 22:p. 3]
In order to define the major elements which compose strategic planning, a
general survey of the literature will be presented to see the similarities and the
differences in the field. Hence, a consensus definition will be derived and broken
down into its key components. Two strategic planning models (Ascher and the Air
Force) will be observed to show the functional relationships of the components.
B. STRATEGIC PLANNING - DEFINITION
Strategic planning like command and control is a term that means different
things to different people, however there appears to be less deviation in definition
which is not the case for C2. Like C2, strategic planning is a process. Its main
purpose is to "select future areas of activity and future courses of action for the
organization." [Ref 23:p. 4] According to James B. Whittaker in Strategic Planning
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in a Rapidly Changing Environment, Strategic planning in the corporate world
involves:
analyzing the environment of the firm to determine specific threats and
opportunities; evaluating the firm to determine the key skills and resources that
could be used to develop a competitive strategy in a given product-market
situation; integrating the unique skills and resources with the specific
opportunities in the firm's environment; establishing corporate objectives for
where the company wants to be at a certain time; and creating a number of
corporate policies, plans, programs, and tasks to successfully accomplish the
objectives that were established. [Ref 22:p. 4]
This definition clearly shows a step by step process applicable for the corporate
world. K. J. Radford in Strategic Planning: An Analytical Approach, shows a similar
process. Planning involves:
visualizing possible future situations in which the organization concerned might
be involved; placing these situations in an order of preference relative to the
objectives of the organization; and considering ways in which the most
preferred of the future situations considered can be brought about and the
least preferred avoided. [Ref 23:p. 1]
Both of the above definitions are systemic in nature. Some authors contend
that too much is made of the systemic aspects of strategic planning. George Steiner
in his work, Strategic Planning, states that strategic planning "is more of a thought
process, an intellectual exercise, than a prescribed set of processes, procedures,
structures, or techniques." [Ref 24:p. 14] He agrees with the other authors that
planning means "designing a desired future and identifying ways to bring it about,"
[Ref 24:p. 14] but he warns planners to be careful not to be so bogged down with
the procedural aspects that plans become cast in bronze. Another point that Steiner
emphasizes is the need to set specific objectives. He bluntly states, "a strategic
planning process will not get very far if at some point specific objectives are not set."
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[Ref 24:p. 39] These definitions are systemic, but not rigid and allow the planner
some intellectual freedom in the process.
The above definitions were more appropriate to the corporate world although
conceptually they can easily be applied to the military. To get the military
orientation, the U.S. Army War College published a document, "An Approach to
Long-Range Strategic Planning". This document stated that the most common
method of strategic planning consists of "identifying a set of fixed interests,
juxtaposing them on a fixed environment (or world, or set of conditions) and then
creating a strategy for attaining the national interests within the constraints imposed
by the environment." [Ref 25:p. 1] Strategic planning is looked at as a
methodology.
All four references of strategic planning have some common ground. Although
Steiner sees it more of an intellectual exercise or thought process, four significant
components are clearly seen; objectives and/or interests, future environment,
resources and strategy. These four components are very much entrenched in the
other definitions. Radford and Whittaker say pretty much the same thing in a more
verbose way. The Army War College document is the most precise. The next
section will expand on these four key components of the strategic planning process.
C. COMPONENTS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
The strategic planning process can be explained more simply if broken down
into its most fundamental components. The fundamental components are broken
down into objectives, future environment, resources and strategy. Now that these
are identified, the next question is; which comes first? Clearly, strategy is last as this
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is the output of the strategic planning process. Do we look at the future first, or do
we establish objectives first? What about resources?
If the actor has a great deal of influence, developing objectives before looking
at alternative futures is reasonable. If the influence is low, it makes more
sense to look at the environment and see what opportunities (choice of
objectives) are available. [Ref 26:p. 60]
1. Objectives
Good organizational objectives must be established if strategic planning
is to be successful. Poorly established objectives will lead to poor strategies.
Objectives can be derived from interests. The Army War College model and the
Asher model use interests in lieu of objectives as the major component. U.S.
national security objectives are statements of broad goals which support and advance
national interests. [Ref 27:p. 4] A sequence can be seen. Interests lead to
objectives which finally lead to strategies. So in order to establish good objectives,
interests need to be stated clearly.
When describing interests the planner must be careful not to be too
specific. Specific interests change quickly over time and do not allow much room
for uncertainty. The key is to "state the interests at a sufficiently high level of
generality that they will not change greatly during the time period under consider-
ation." [Ref 28:p. 22] It is also important that the interests are not too vague, or
it will be difficult to establish concrete objectives. An example of a U.S. interest is
"the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its
fundamental values and institutions intact." [Ref 27:p. 4] A principal objective
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which would support our national interest is "to maintain the security of our nation
and our allies." [Ref 27:p. 4]
Clearly, interests and objectives provide the framework in which strategy
is developed. Many of our problems in developing a grand or military strategy can
be attributed to a lack of consensus on what is the national interest. It is very
difficult, if not impossible to find individuals in the Executive branch or Congress
who come to an agreement on what is the national interest. Many times this can be
attributed to parochialism or a fragmented approach to defining interests. This
problem will grow as more and more individuals get their hand in the policy-making
arena.
2. Future Environment
The projected future environment also plays a crucial role in the planning
process. The planner attempts to design a desired future and then identify the ways
to bring it about. Designing a future environment is more difficult than it looks.
Under this approach the planner assumes some control in shaping the future. A
good planner will identify several plausible alternative futures to validate the
process. This will be done so that "whenever planning and programming is done it
will be accomplished with a realistic consideration of more than just the present
world extrapolated in the distant future." [Ref 21:p. 3] It is very dangerous to put
all the eggs in one basket when it comes to defining alternative futures. One
contention from this author and others is that most strategic planning in the military
is centered around a war with the Soviet Union in Europe.
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...most military planning being done in the United States and Western Europe
assumes that the Soviet Union will remain the predominate adversary for the
foreseeable future; hence, there is little point in spending time thinking about
emerging adversaries. ...it is time to go through the agonizing process of
consideration of other potential adversaries in conjunction with a changing
bilateral relationship with the Soviets themselves. [Ref 21:p. 4]
In the military, one of the key drivers in determining force structure,
weapon procurement, C2 systems and tactics is the threat. Military intelligence
analysts continue to project the future threat to provide justification to Congress for
the resources required to adequately meet that threat. With the recent events in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Pentagon planners are having a difficult time
justifying to Congress many of its programs. This trend can be expected to continue
in the next two decades.
When identifying alternative future environments planners must be careful
not to be too fragmented. Problems arise when DOD looks at the future in purely
military terms, and the State Department looks at the future in only foreign policy
terms. National security planning and programming which is based almost
exclusively on expectations of military threats can bankrupt the United States. [Ref
21:p. 21] Politics, economics and social factors must be considered when developing
alternative futures. No longer does the military threat stand alone, there are too
many other factors spun in the web of national security planning.
3. Resources
Before a worthwhile strategy can be developed the planner must look at
the resources that are at his disposal. What resources are going to be required to
meet our national interests in the projected future environment? If resources are
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constrained, there is no reason to develop a comprehensive strategy that will
consume more resources than are available. Understanding this will be extremely
important for DOD in the years ahead as Congress in all likelihood will divert
resources from defense to social programs as Americans see our national security
threatened more by AIDS, drugs and crime.
All three definitions speak about the means necessary to reach their
objectives in the future environment. Whittaker's definition talks about "integrating
the unique skills and resources with the specific opportunities in the firm's
environment." [Ref 22:p. 4] Radford states an organization must "consider ways in
which the most preferred of the future situations can be brought about." [Ref 23:p.
1] Clearly from intuition, the "ways" that Radford speaks of is going to be bounded
by the resources available within the organization. The Army definition says you
"create a strategy for attaining the national interests within the constraints imposed
by the environment." The environment also includes those resources that the
organization has available to attain the national interests.
Resources encompass much more than money. It also includes such
important things as time and level of effort. Within an organization or the military
these intangible things are very important. You may have all the money in the
world to meet your objectives, but if such things as morale, initiative and corporate
cohesion are lacking it may be very difficult to accomplish the objectives. The
planner must consider not only the tangible resources but the intangible resources
at his disposal as well.
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4. Strategy
Developing strategy is the goal of the strategic planning process. Interests
are first identified, then alternative future environments are developed, and finally
strategy is developed to influence the environment in such a way as to satisfy the
interests and objectives. Many times strategy is looked at merely in the military
context. This outlook creates fragmentation which was mentioned earlier. A
definition of strategy can be found in JCS Pub 1:
The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological,
and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum
support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable
consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. [Ref 3:p. 350]
Strategy is a term that can be interpreted in many different ways. Gregory
D. Foster in his paper "A Conceptual Foundation for the Development of Strategy"
characterized strategy as: a paradigm; as a philosophy of global conduct; as an
exercise in perceptions management; as a map to the future; as the marriage of ends
and means. [Ref 29:p. 17] Some view strategy as an art, while others see it as a
science. The JCS definition states it as an art and a science. The scientist would
see strategy as a concrete plan with quantifiable measures of performance, whereas,
strategy as an art would be more from an intuitive standpoint or as a method of
thought.
However the planner views strategy it is imperative that his philosophy is
known and everyone in the planning process is onboard so everyone is playing to the
same tune. Difficulties arise when planners at the higher levels see strategy merely
in their own arena. This has been a common problem in DOD. The individual
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services were many times marching to different drumbeats when developing strategy.
This is one big reason why the services have interoperability problems with their C2
systems. Their parochial views of seeing the threat and finding the best way to
counter it are often done without any coordination. The Army has its plan to meet
the threat, so does the Navy and the Air Force. This leads to the services going out
and buying their own systems. This approach led to great problems in C2 in the
invasion of Grenada.
When developing strategy it is very important to understand what level of
strategy you are working from. Is it a purely military strategy or one that uses
political and economic muscle also? If it is a military strategy, is it a tactical or
theater decision? There are clearly different levels of strategy. Strategy can be
broken into more definable levels. Coming to a consensus on what are the levels
of strategy is no easy task. Many strategists have their ideas of how the breakdown
should be. John M. Collins in Grand Strategy: Practices and Principles, reflects
five distinct decision-making levels: grand strategy, military doctrine, strategy,
operational art, and tactics. [Ref 30] When developing strategy for war the break-
down may be tactical, operational, and theater. Edward Luttwak in his book
Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, goes further when talking about levels of
strategy. He identifies five levels: technical, tactical, operational, theater and grand
strategy. [Ref 31]
* Technical-The technical interplay of specific weapons and counterweapons.
[Ref 31:p. 69]
" Tactical-The tactical combat of the forces that employ those particular
weapons, and the strengths and weaknesses of those forces derive from all sorts
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of intangible and material factors that are very different from the scientific and
engineering limitations of weapons. [Ref 31:p. 69]
Operational-The operational level governs the consequences of what is done
or not done tactically. Again the factors conditioned by the logic are different:
details of topography or disposition, for example, are now submerged, and it
is the overall interaction of the respective schemes of warfare that matters.
Events at the operational level can be very large in scale, but never autono-
mous; they are governed in turn by the broader interaction of the armed forces
as whole within the entire theater of warfare, just as battles are merely parts
of campaigns. [Ref 31:p. 69]
" Theater Strategy-It is at this higher level of theater strategy that the conse-
quences of single operations are felt in the overall conduct of offense and
defense-those overriding military purposes that scarcely figure at the
operational level, in which a bombing campaign might be launched by
defenders while the aggressor is preoccupied with air defense, and in which an
attack can serve to better defend a front while holding operations on some
sectors often figure in offensive warfare. [Ref 31:pp. 69-70]
" Grand Strategy-The entire conduct of warfare and peacetime preparation for
war are in turn subordinate expressions of national struggles that unfold at the
highest level of grand strategy, where all that is military happens within the
much broader context of domestic governance, international politics, economic
activity, and their ancillaries. Because ultimate ends and basic means are both
manifest only at the level of grand strategy, the resource limits of military
action are defined at that level, and so its true meaning: even a most
successful conquest is only a provisional result that can be overturned by the
diplomatic intervention of more powerful states or even repudiated by domestic
political decision; by contrast, even a major military debacle can be redeemed
by the political transformation it engenders, or undone by the newfound allies
that weakness can attract in the usual workings of the balance of power. [Ref
31:p. 70]
This provides an example of the different levels of strategy. Breaking down strategy
into levels add more complexity to the strategic planning process. Different
strategists have different ideas concerning the levels of strategy. Luttwak was
selected to give the reader a feel of one of the more complicated breakdowns.
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D. COMPARATIVE STRATEGY - FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS OF
COMPONENTS: THE ASCHER AND AIR FORCE MODELS
To bring more light on strategic planning and its functional relationships, a
model can be examined to understand some of the interdependencies involved in the
process. There are several models available. The strategic planning model devel-
oped in Ascher & Overholts' book Strategic Planning & Forecasting. Political Risk
and Economic Opportunity_, and the Air Force force structure model will be looked
at to highlight these relationships.
1. Ascher and Overholt's Strategic Planning Model
Models are excellent tools which can be used by decision makers to aid
in the decision making process. In a strategic planning model the analyst attempts
to simulate the future environment so that strategies can be developed and tested
to see which ones might be the most prudent to implement. Ascher and Overholt
propose two models, one for actors who have little influence over the environment,
and a more sophisticated model for actors who have considerable influence over the
environment. The more sophisticated model will be explored because of the United
States' considerable influence in shaping the environment. Some readers may beg
to differ with this opinion based on the recent events in Eastern Europe.
Before describing the model certain critical problems with strategic
planning must be addressed. Three of the most basic problems the planner deals
with are:
* Uncertainty - Coping with the uncertainty resulting from inadequate
knowledge and excessive complexity.
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* Self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies - Coping with the fact that
conditions are not fixed externally but are strongly affected by decisions.
* Fragmentation - Coping with the fragmentation of the policy-planning process
into isolated regional and functional groups. [Ref 28:p. 21]
The first thing which must be accomplished in the model is the
establishing of interests. This step in the process is often overlooked and given little
attention. Describing interests in the face of uncertainty is the easiest part of the
problem. [Ref 28:p. 22] When describing interests the planner must be careful not
to be too specific. Specific interests change quickly over time and do not allow
much room for uncertainty. Listing the interests is the first step. Interests are
sometime intertwined with one another so tradeoffs with each of the interests may
be required. After listing the interests the planner must:
second, attempt to weight the interests; third, evaluate the interest in the
specific region and time period of interest; and fourth, comprehend as well as
possible the ways in which the different interests complement and contradict
one another. [Ref 28:p. 24]
After listing the interests, analysis of the future environment can begin.
Describing the future environment in the face of uncertainty is a formidable
problem. One principal solution to irreducible uncertainty is to project several
alternative possible environments. [Ref 28:p. 26] An alternative future environment
is a "description of a possible future state of events relevant to the planning object."
[Ref 26:p. 50] It must be emphasized that an alternative future environment does
not connote prediction, but rather is a tool that is used to systematically think about
the future. In developing these environments the authors say that they "should be
sufficiently few to be intellectually manageable, but sufficiently numerous to display
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most of the important alternative outcomes of the trends in the world." [Ref 28:p.
26]
The Ascher and Overholt model conceptualizes the environment into
three parts; Core, Environment 1...n, and Exogenous contingencies. These can be
defined as:
" Core - the portion of the environment the actor can largely control relative to
his interests or that is stable regardless of his actions.
* Environments 1...n - those portions of the environment that are distinct from
each other and from the core and over which the actor has less influence.
* Exogenous contingencies - random, uncontrollable, or unpredictable events.
[Ref 26:p. 57]
Simply stated the environment consists of deterministic elements (Core), possible
elements (environments 1...n), and unpredictable elements (Exogenous




Figure 3 Asher Model (Environments)
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The next step in the model is to take the defined interests and project
them on the environments to develop a strategy. Ascher & Overholt come up with
an overall strategy which is made up of three parts: core strategy, basic strategy, and
hedging strategy. The core strategy is developed to deal with the core environment,
that part of the environment common to all of the projected environments. The
core strategy consists of those actions that will achieve the actor's interests in the
core environment. A core strategy is necessarily abstract and extremely flexible.
[Ref 28:p. 311 Core strategies tend to be simple and straightforward and many times
may constitute a national doctrine such as the Truman Doctrine.
The basic strategy has a dual purpose "to influence the environment
toward the optimal one (hereafter called the basic environment) and to facilitate
success within that optimal environment." [Ref 28:p. 30] Formulation of a basic
strategy thus involves:
* Choice of a preferred environment.
* Design of a strategy for getting into the preferred environment.
" Design of a strategy for succeeding in the preferred environment. [Ref 28:p.
34]
The preferred environment chosen should be one that is practical and has a
relatively high degree of certainty that it can be attained.
The hedging strategy is designed to deal with contingencies for which
neither the core strategy nor the combination of core strategy and basic strategy is
adequate. [Ref 28:p. 34] An example of a contingency which may not have been
planned for is the historic change taking place in the Eastern Bloc nations. The
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more comprehensive the basic strategy, the less likely it will be to develop an ad hoc





Figure 4 Asher Model
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2. The Air Force Model
The Air Force has long been a leader in strategic planning in DOD. It
uses a variety of models to determine force structure, weapons procurement, and
strategy among other things. Lt Col John Stewart in his work "Methods for
Developing Alternative Futures and Long-Range Planning" interviewed Air Staff
planners on methods for strategic planning. One example the Air Force uses for









Figure 5 Air Force Model
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The first step in the model is the development of objectives. Once the
objectives are developed, they are compared to the threat. Based on that
comparison a strategy is developed to meet the threat. Necessary force structure
requirements are then developed to meet the goals of the strategy. These
requirements are compared to current force levels to determine shortfalls. These
shortfalls are then prioritized and become part of the acquisition program. The final
step is an assessment of the acquisition program relative to the original objective.
[Ref 26:p. 58] The process is an iterative one.
A notable feature of this Air Force model is that it is objectives, threat,
and strategy-driven. [Ref 26:p. 59] These elements come from other planning
processes such as the Defense Guidance and the JCS and DIA intelligence reports
which specify the threat. Nothing is mentioned of alternative futures, however it can
be assumed that the alternative futures are constrained by the threat and fiscal
restraints. The fundamental building blocks in this model are threat and resources.
There are similarities in both models such as establishing objectives up front. The
Ascher and Overholt model is a little more specific in generating alternative futures.
The point is that there are many models available to the planner. These two are
just a few of the many available. The planner must choose one that is pertinent to
his situation and one that he is comfortable with. Hopefully, this provides a better




Strategic planning is a discipline that is gaining greater notoriety with the
rapidly changing events. With a great change in the threat and projected decreases
in the defense budget, it is going to be imperative that our military planners field
systems that are functional in many types of environments. Getting the most bang
for the buck is going to be even more critical in the years to come. Tommorrow's
C2 systems must be interoperable and functional in many environments. Strategic
planning models need to be developed that are responsive to the changes taking
place. Identifying those changes in the future environment is going to be a greater
challenge. With the changes in Eastern Europe, planners are going to have to
stretch their imaginations beyond a war with the Soviet Union on European soil.
The future appears bright and dynamic for the strategic planner. The next chapter
will survey a few of the techniques available for developing alternative futures.
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IV. DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
This chapter will define and analyze the history of Futures Research. Several
methods which futurists use for developing alternative futures will be discussed in
some detail to provide a feel of what is available to the planner. These will include
Trend Extrapolation, Genius Forecasting and Scenario building. Other methods in
the spectrum which may be used will be briefly defined including regression analysis,
leading indicators, complex models and the Delphi technique.
A. INTRODUCTION/HISTORY
Coming up with plausible alternative futures is a difficult but exciting exercise
that stretches the intellect. It requires a unique individual with a creative
imagination who is not limited to only extrapolating the present into the future.
Developing alternative futures "forces the mind out of the lets plan for the most
likely future which is so common yet so intellectually restrictive." [Ref 26 p. 4] The
future is no longer something that can be ascertained easily. The changes that are
taking place in Eastern Europe bear witness to the fact that the environment is
changing rapidly. Futurist Olaf Helmer states:
The future is no longer viewed as unique, foreseeable, and inevitable; instead,
it is realized that there are a multitude of possible futures, with associated
probabilities that can be estimated and, to some extent, manipulated. [Ref 32:
p. 17]
Futures research and synonymous terms futurology and futuristics, and those
who perform (futurists) is not something new. In fact, some of the earliest futures
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research can be dated back to the U.S. Army Air Force when Gen "Hap" Arnold
"commissioned a study Toward New Horizons (completed in 1947) on future military
technological capabilities." [Ref 33:p. 9] The military establishments were the
pioneers in futures research and they "continue to provide extensive support to
futures-oriented research." [Ref 33:p. 10] Futurology takes as its point of departure:
A belief in the laws of nature as postulated by modem physical and social
science; and all of the methods used by futurists in attempting to forecast the
future are based on the regularities of physical and social behavior postulated
by modern science. [Ref 33:p. 16]
Futurists are more concerned with identifying possible alternative futures and
assessing their probabilities of materializing, rather than predicting the course of
particular sets of events. Futures research is utilized to aid the planner. All
planners are therefore necessarily de facto descriptive futurists. [Ref 33:p. 24]
There are many futures research methods available to assist the planner in
identifying alternative futures. It is the planner who must decide which method is
most applicable and will bring about the most plausible alternative futures.
B. TREND EXTRAPOLATION
Trend extrapolation is one of the most obvious and simple techniques
available. It assumes that what has been happening in the past will continue to
happen and that the direction of change and the rate of change can be extrapolated
into the future. [Ref 33:p. 20] Trend extrapolation has many limitations but it is
popular because it is rather quick, inexpensive, and does not require a great
understanding of causal factors. It is a good starting point if the planner does not
have familiarity with any of the other methods.
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Trend extrapolation is an empirical analysis and "forces a decision on exactly
what problem is of concern and on how that problem can be indexed numerically."
[Ref 34:p. 250] The numbers do the talking because of a lack of understanding of
the causal relationships. Understanding causal factors require rigorous intellectual
thought. The planner must realize that these statistical time-series which are used
to plot trend lines is not infallible. A trend in the past does not guarantee that the
trend will continue into the future, however, understanding the trend can provide
greater knowledge of likely developments. Most planners:
who engage in trend extrapolation are not so naive as to believe that trends
must necessarily continue in the future as in the past. What is being posited
is rather that certain causes are operating to produce certain effects and that
unless one can find reason to believe that these causes will cease to operate
as they have in the past, one must assume predictions based on this method
will vary with one's assessment of the causes of existing trends and the likely
stability of these causes. [Ref 33:p. 21]
Trend extrapolation continues to be the most widely used technique for
developing alternative futures. It is many times used as part of a larger model. Its
utility lies in its ability to be predictive with limited success. If one wants to
understand the causal relationships, more vigorous analysis should take place. Used
in the context of being used with other techniques, trend extrapolation is a good and
rough prediction of the future and should be part of the planner's bag of tools.
C. GENIUS FORECASTING
No matter what technique the planner uses, there is no substitute for rigorous
intellectual thought. Many great thinkers such as Asimov, Mead and Kahn who have
a knack for looking into the future have added credibility to futures research. Their
contribution to the field have resulted in a methodology called Genius Forecasting.
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Genius forecasting is what results when a well-informed and bright individual
examines the present and past and makes predictions about the future based on his
own judgments. [Ref 33:p. 22] This does not say that the genius forecaster does not
use some of the more developed techniques, but rather that "the final product is
blended and evaluated by the individual forecaster in terms of his own sense of the
direction in which the world is going." [Ref 33:p. 22]
The problem with genius forecasting lies with the fallibility of the individual.
No individual has a complete grasp of the past historical events or can see into the
future. The credibility of the genius forecast rests entirely on the individual doing
it. This technique assumes that "the human mind presumably can detect subtleties
of meaning that other approaches, which require categorization and formal
measurement, cannot capture." [Ref 28:p. 85]
The attitude among the futures research community is to avoid genius
forecasting as much as possible and utilize the many other credible methods
available. Genius forecasting has an uneven record as a predictive method. [Ref
26:p 81] These shortcomings however, do not negate the contribution of genius
forecasting to futures research. This method offers an innovative way to look out
into the future without getting weighed down with some of the more mundane
methods. The intellectual vigor that bright individuals have to offer can only
enhance the process.
D. SCENARIO BUILDING
A method which is gaining popular support within the Department of Defense
(DOD) is scenario building. Scenarios were developed for use in a recent revision
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of the Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal, the DOD document which looks 10-
20 years into the future. The Army has come out with a futures report which
describe "four future alternative world scenarios (environments) that are plausible,
realistic, and appropriate for Army planning." [Ref 35:p. 1] Herman Kahn, one of
the more influential practitioners of scenario building describes scenarios as:
hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of focusing
attention on causal processes and decision points. They answer two kinds of
questions: (1) Precisely how might some hypothetical situation come about,
step by step? and (2) What alternatives exist, for each actor, at each step, for
preventing, diverting, or facilitating the process. [Ref 36:p. 6]
Scenario building is not a method in and of itself but rather uses other
methods such as trend extrapolation, simulation, Delphi technique, etc... to develop
scenarios. Scenarios are hypothetical in nature since the future is unknowable.
They are not intended to be a prediction but rather a narrative or sketch that paints
the environment at some near or far off time. The validity of methods used to build
plausible scenarios is generally determined by a consensus of expert opinion. [Ref
35:p. 2] The methods utilized are generally qualitative in nature, however
quantitative methods may be used if applicable. Methods are chosen to attempt to
be "multifaceted and holistic in their approach to the future." [Ref 34:p. 226] The
more comprehensive the scenario the better.
When developing scenarios, guidelines should be established to allow for the
development of the most plausible alternatives. The Army used four guidelines to
develop scenarios for the years 2005 and 2020 in their Futures Report at the Army
War College:
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" The logic and assumptions of the scenarios must be plausible over time.
" The scenarios must focus on issues relevant to Army interests.
" The scenarios must include valid trends and key variables that are realistic and
challenge traditional Army stationing, training, doctrine, and employment
concepts.
" The scenarios must be free of disruptive, aberrant, catastrophic, and anomalous
events that would nullify their usefulness for long-range planning. [Ref 35:p.
3]
Adhering to simple guidelines such as the ones above will enable planners to
develop more realistic scenarios.
Scenarios like the other methods contain flaws, especially since the other
methods may be used in developing the scenario. A large amount of individual
judgement is used in developing scenarios which takes us back to the problem with
genius forecasting; the credibility of the scenario depends on the credibility of those
building the scenarios. The selling point for scenarios lies in its adaptability to
utilize some of the other methods to create specific scenarios tailored to the
planning object.
E. OTHER METHODS
Several other methods which may be used for developing alternative futures
include the following:
Regression Analysis-The prediction of one trend or event based on its
relationship with one or more other trends. The analysis will make possible
predictions about events (the probabilities that events will or will not occur)
through several variants of regression analysis, such as discriminate function
analysis or probit analysis. [Ref 28:p. 71]
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e Leading Indicators-A more modest variant of the regression approach. The
direction of change in the trend under examination is presumed to depend on,
or at least to be signaled by, earlier changes in the directions of other trends.
Leading indicators are often used in economic forecasting. [Ref 28:p. 74]
* Complex Models-Encompass a wide range of approaches that have one thing
in common: they specify two or more explicit propositions that share at least
one factor or variable. Econometric models are distinguished by their reliance
on equations whose constants are estimated on the basis of existing, actual
data. [Ref 28:p. 751
* Delphi Technique-An interactive method, which avoids face-to-face
intimidation and groupthink by using several rounds of written questionnaires
that give the participants feedback on what the others say and why they differ
in their opinions. The comprehensiveness of considerations taken into account
by each of the participants is likely to be enhanced. [Ref 28: p. 87]
These definitions provide a cursory view of the spectrum of methods available to
develop alternative futures.
F. SUMMARY
Many methods are available to the planner. He must choose a method or
combination of methods to help him paint a picture of the future so that strategies
can be developed. Criterion for choosing a method must be developed. Such
properties as plausibility, explicitness, comprehensiveness and simplicity should be
considered. The method selected should be one that matches the planner's
temperament and job. Some methods such as leading indicators and trend
extrapolation would be more useful for economic forecasting. Some individuals are
more scientific in nature and would be more comfortable with quantitative methods,
while the creative intellectual might use genius forecasting or the Delphi technique.
This chapter attempted to briefly expose the reader to several of the methods
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available. Ihere are many sources available which can provide a more detail study
of the methods discussed in this chapter. Chapter V looks into the 21st century to
examine the national interest and the threat.
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V. BEYOND THE 21ST CENTURY: EMERGING THREATS AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST
In the next two decades the security environment facing the United States will
change as a result of both broad economic, demographic, and military trends
that are already taking shape, and specific shocks and discontinuities that, at
present, can be recognized only as possibilities. [Ref 37:p. 1]
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter challenges the traditional way by which DOD does threat
assessments by taking a more comprehensive view of the national interest, and by
going beyond the traditional view of the Soviet Union as our primary threat to a
more multi-dimensional characterization of the threat. This chapter looks at several
issues impacting the national interests in the 21st century including the future
economy and some emerging social problems. Secondly, it projects the most likely
international threats facing our nation in the year 2000. The Soviet threat will be
briefly looked at followed by three of the more plausible threats the military may
have to respond to: narcotics trafficking, low intensity conflict (LIC) in the Persian
Gulf, and ballistic missile proliferation. Finally, instability as a threat will be briefly
addressed. The findings from this chapter will be utilized in Chapter VI to identify
the types of C2 systems DOD should pursue.
Strategy, military posture, weapons systems and the command and control
systems that support them are constrained by the national interest, resources
available, and the future threat environment. These are the fundamental building
blocks in the development of strategy. Resources are interwoven in the national
47
interest. If national security is a m. : priority in the national interest then defense
will grab a bigger share of the federal budget. Determining the national interest in
the years ahead is a much easier exercise than determining the future threat environ-
ment.
B. THE NATIONAL INTEREST
Identifying national interests should be the first thing done in the strategic
planning process. The interests should be stated at a high level of generality so that
they won't change much during the time period under consideration. In the National
Security Strategy of the United States written in 1987, five interests were identified:
" The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its
fundamental values and institutions intact.
" A healthy and growing U.S. economy.
" The growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies
throughout the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system.
* A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests.
o The health and vigor of U.S. alliance relationships. [Ref 27:p. 4]
In this document it is stated that our national security strategy is based on "a
solid understanding of U.S. interests and objectives and a realistic approach to
dealing with the Soviet Union and other threats to U.S. security." [Ref 27:p. 4] Two
key points about this statement need to be amplified. A solid understanding of U.S.
interests is required, and the Soviet Union is seen as the principal threat to our
national security. The questions which must be considered are: Will these interests
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be the same in the year 2000, and second, will the Soviet Union be our primary
threat?
"A healthy and growing economy" [Ref 27:p. 4] is listed as the U.S.'s number
two interest. Clearly, the number one interest of "the survival of the U.S. as a free
independent nation" [Ref 27:p. 4] will remain number one, but will the state of the
economy and other emerging factors overshadow the number one interest because
of our perception of a decrease in the Soviet threat? The answer to this question
will have a direct impact on our military posture.
1. The Future U.S. Economy
Trying to envisage the future of the U.S. economy alone is difficult and
inevitably shrouded in uncertainty. [Ref 38:p. 2] The most accepted and practical
indicators of the strength of the U.S. economy is the GNP. The Rand Corporation
has developed some GNP projections for the Future Security Environment Working
Group of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Two important points
about the estimates are important to note: first, the growth rates reflected in the
following estimates are derived rather than assumed; second, the estimated GNP
figures for the period 1987-2010 are intended to be consistent with the actual GNP
figures for 1950-1986. [Ref 38:p. 3]
The average annual growth rate for the United States is estimated at 2.6
percent per year, which will give us a $4.682 trillion GNP in 1990, a $6.072 trillion
GNP in 2000, and a $7.859 trillion GNP in 2010. [Ref 38:p. 4] An interesting
observation from the Rand Report should be noted; by 2010, the combined national
products of the East Asian countries (Japan, China, South Korea, and Taiwan) will
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exceed the GNP of the U.S. (8.5 trillion 1986 U.S. dollars versus 7.9 trillion for the
United States). [Ref 38:p. 6] This gradual shift in economic power to the Pacific
rim may well shift our national interest emphasis from Western Europe to the Far
East.
One thing remains certain; the U.S. will continue to exert considerable
economic influence in the international economy. Whether or not a 2.6 percent
growth rate is accurate, an even smaller growth rate will still put us ahead of the
pack. This author projects a smaller growth rate in the economy somewhere
between one and two percent per year. Too many large problems loom over our
head which will not be resolved in the near future. The federal deficit will continue
to be large and sap much needed capital from industry which will mean less capital
for research & development (R&D) and modernization. The U.S. personal savings
rate will pick up some in the 90s but will be further behind other developed nations
in the year 2000. How government, industry and the American people respond to
these issues in the 90s will greatly influence the state of our economy in the year
2000 and beyond.
2. Emerging Social Problems
The contemporary national interest is part of a much larger context which
goes beyond protecting our borders from foreign powers. Social problems which
took a back seat in the Reagan years on the policy agenda will threaten our national
security in the next two decades. Across the nation the public is calling on the
federal government to solve many of our social woes. No longer does the American
public see the Soviet Union as the primary threat to their security but rather they
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see a multi-dimensional threat. They see drugs, crime, AIDS, the environment, and
care for the elderly as imminent dangers facing our nation. With the recent events
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the public and elected officials will call for
a reduction in the defense budget, and more funds appropriated to resolve our social
problems.
In recent polls the drug problem has been considered the number one
problem facing our society. Drugs will continue to be a large problem into the 21st
century consuming an increasing share of the federal budget. Demand for drugs will
decrease some in the 90s but there will continue to be a large market for the drug
dealers. The public will ask for increased resources to fight this menacing problem.
The military will be tasked to share an increased responsibility in this war on drugs.
This will have an impact on force structure, tactics, missions and C2 systems.
Another trend that may affect the future security environment is the rising
incidence of AIDS in many areas of the world. [Ref 37:p. 11] The U.S. government
will find itself spending more money to combat this epidemic. The cost of health
care for this problem is estimate ,o rise to $70 billion by 2000 if current levels of
care are continued. [Ref 37:p. 11] That level of spending will consume a large
share of the federal budget. The AIDS problem will also cause other nations to
prohibit access to basing facilities to prevent further spreading of the virus by U.S.
servicemen.
Drugs and AIDS are two of the more major problems that will affect our
national security and influence our national interests. Other problems such as crime,
the environment, and the elderly must also be considered in the national security
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equation. The point of this section is to emphasize how the state of the economy
and social issues will guide our national interests and have a direct impact on federal
spending and the posture of the future military. The other key factor in deriving
strategy; the threat, will be discussed next.
C. EMERGING STRATEGIC THREATS (INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT)
Trying to determine the threat ten to twenty years into the future is probably
the most difficult part in the strategic planning process. Recent events in Eastern
Europe attest to the fact that we live in a volatile world that can change rapidly. In
surveying the literature, this author found no one who predicted the collapsing of
communism in Eastern Europe so soon. Despite the volatility in the international
environment it is imperative that planners attempt to anticipate the threat as best
they can. This section is an attempt to do that.
The international environment is large and the potential threats to our national
security are immense. The Soviet Union has predominately been viewed as the
major threat to our security. U.S. military strategy has been centered around a war
with the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. The Soviet Union will continue to be our
major military competitor based on the size of its past investments and its trend
toward strategic modernization and its intense effort in R&D. The questions which
must be asked; will the Soviets continue to be the most likely threat to our national
security or will other threats emerge that will create greater instability and require
a response from our military? The next section addresses the Soviet threat briefly,
and then centers on three of the more likely threats our military will have to
respond to in the years 2000 and beyond.
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1. Soviet Threat
The overall Soviet strategy has been to use its increased military power
to negate that of the United States and to employ it as a coercive factor in
diplomacy vis-a-vis its neighbors in order to preserve and extend the Soviet empire.
[Ref 39:p. 13] Will the Soviets continue on with this strategy of expanding its
empire via their military machine? The poor health of their economy will prevent
them from continuing on the path of increased military spending. Soviet leaders
have recognized that a stronger economy is necessary if they are to remain a world
power in the years ahead. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is looking for breathing
space to permit the necessary domestic reforms and allow for future modernization
of the military.
The Soviets are very concerned that if their economy does not pick up
that the U.S. will widen the technology gap. Soviet experts now stress the need to
emphasize qualitative improvements- in the sense of exploiting advanced
technologies in force planning and military concepts. [Ref 40:p. 43] They will
emphasize the qualitative modernization of their military, while at the same time
push for initiatives in arms-control and threat reduction. Senior Soviet military
personnel are now holding aloft the qualitative modernization of the Soviet Armed
Forces as a scientifically established and politically-oriented goal. [Ref 40:p. 39]
Soviet military planners will emphasize key technologies such as improved
C31 which include reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition and battle
management. They will also be concentrating R&D efforts in advanced conventional
and physical-principal weapons systems. The Soviets recognize that the scope and
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speed of war will change in the years ahead with the advent of precision guided
munitions and weapons utilizing lasers and directed energy. They will continue to
exploit space for military applications. It is evident that the Soviets recognize the
impact of high-technology initiatives on the future battlefield. This thinking will
guide their strategies and military posture in the years to come.
The Soviet Union will continue to be our greatest threat regardless of the
success or failure of Mikhail Gorbachev. Although they are rethinking their
philosophy towards capitalism and the U.S., they will not change their views about
the legitimacy of capitalism and the destiny of socialism as the leader in a new world
order. It must be emphasized that they will be the only nation in the world with the
capability to destroy the United States in the year 2000. We must be cautious and
prudent with the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.
Even though they are the greatest threat, doubts remain if they will be the most
likely threat. This author sees other threats to our national security more probable
in the years ahead.
2. Narcotics Trafficking
Narcotics trafficking out of Latin America represents the most dangerous
threat to T T q natinnal security interest,; since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. [Ref
41:p. 27] This threat breeds violence, promotes instability and threatens governing
institutions wherever it is found. The type of instability that is generated from this
enormous threat to national security is a breeding ground for low intensity conflict
(LIC). The illicit production of drugs is a major threat to U.S. interests today and
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will continue to be so for the immediate future (and more than likely into the 21st
century). [Ref 4 1:p. 32]
U.S. consumption of illegal drugs from Latin America and Southwest Asia
is not only threatening our survival as a nation, but the very nations who supply
them. American consumers provide more of the money that underwrites illicit drug
production, processing, and trafficking worldwide than any other nationality. [Ref
42:p. 63] This consumption of illegal drugs not only undermines our society and
the values we hold dear, but it funnels enormous amounts of cash into the hands of
thugs and criminals who are many times declared enemies of this country. The
illegal use of drugs has a staggering effect on our economy.
Credible estimates of the aggregate annual financial impact of U.S. drug
consumption--taking into account lost productivity, clinical costs, public
information campaigns, and expenditures within the law enforcement, court,
and penal systems, as well as efforts abroad to interdict smugglers and to
eradicate the plants--approximate expenditures each year for national defense.
[Ref 42:p. 64]
The American public has recognized the drug problem as the number
one problem facing our nation, and have called on the president to provide
aggressive leadership to tackle this menacing problem. The president in his 1991
budget gave a substantial increase in funding to ameliorate this problem. It was the
biggest increase for any specific program in the budget. The new drug strategy
called for an increased role by the U.S. military. This increased role will be "larger,
nationally and regionally coordinated and intended to assist the law enforcement
agencies and local governments to delay, disrupt and destroy all stages of illicit drug
production and distribution." [Ref 41:p. 291
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The U.S. military will find itself involved with a new threat to national
security to which it is unaccustomed. This new threat falls in the realm of LIC,
however there are some key differences between drug trafficking and past
experiences with LIC. The main difference being; that drug traffickers are not
politically motivated, but rather money motivated. The drug kingpins see themselves
as astute businessmen taking advantage of the law of supply and demand. Their
main objective is not to overthrow a government or for that matter run one, but
rather they are motivated by the huge profits that come from the distribution and
sale of their product.
A formidable problem lies in their ability to build a large security
apparatus around them to prevent their government or any other foreign government
such as the U.S. from penetrating their organization. Cocaine trafficking is a
particularly poisonous form of LIC in that the traffickers are ruthless, organized and
innovative, and they possess resources that would be the envy of any guerrilla
movement. [Ref 41:p. 29] Colombia is a nation that has been ravaged by the
ruthless drug cartels. Half of Colombia's supreme court justices, and more than two
dozen other judges have been assassinated, as have the editor of the nation's second-
largest newspaper and hundreds of police officers. [Ref 42:p. 68]
Because of the cartels' large coffers of U.S. dollars generated by the
profits of their product, they will continue to buy state of the art military equipment
to support their organization. There have even been rccent reports of their
intention to acquire surface to air missiles (SAM) which can be acquired in the
international arms market. Other problems will arise when these cartels line
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themselves up with politically motivated terrorist and insurgent organizations. These
thug like organizations are hired to provide security to the drug traffickers. The
traffickers have used the proven tools of psychological operations--ethnocentrism,
armed propaganda and money--to gain the support of the population in their area
of operations [Ref 41:p. 29].
Another obstacle that the U.S. will have to overcome is the extensive
signals intelligence (SIGINT) apparatus the cartels have in place. The traffickers
spend an estimated $125 million per year on SIGINT technology and equipment.
[Ref 41:p. 31] With this equipment the traffickers are able to intercept U.S govern-
ment communications which allows them to be one step ahead of the law
enforcement agencies. This has been a very big problem in the past as U.S.
government agencies many times used unsecured communications.
The drug war is presently underway, however this problem will not go
away immediately. There have been some substantial progress made under the
president's new drug strategy, but it's only the tip of the iceberg. This problem will
continue to jeopardize national security in the 21st century and beyond. The U.S.
military will continue to find itself taking on bigger roles to eliminate the drug
problem. New tactics will need to be developed by the military. C2 systems will
play a very important part in fighting this war on drugs as new technologies are
developed.
3. Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) in the Persian Gulf
At the turn of the century the U.S. will continue to find its interests
threatened in many areas of the world by LIC. LIC refers to insurgencies, organized
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terrorism, paramilitary crime, sabotage, and other forms of violence in a shadow
area between peace and open warfare involving larger units. [Ref 43:p. 26] This is
a type of warfare that U.S. armed services normally don't prepare for. The
traditional American view of war has centered around a direct engagement with a
foreign force utilizing all the resources available to decisively defeat it by combat
operations. LIC calls for intrinsically indirect operations, that is, support for objec-
tives fundamentally political, economic, or psychological in nature [Ref 43:p. 26].
This type of warfare is being waged today on many fronts and will
continue well into the 21st century. Volatile areas, primarily Third World countries
will be the staging areas for LIC. Areas as close as our backyard (Central America)
will be ripe for this type of conflict. As population growth rates and unemployment
increases, many nations like Mexico will pose serious risks to political and social
stability which will in-turn affect immigration to the U.S. One area with the greatest
potential for instability and LIC which this thesis will focus on is the Persian Gulf
region.
The Persian Gulf region is an area rich in history and oil. Our
fundamental interest in the Gulf has lain and continues to lie in assuring secure
access to its oil. [Ref 44:p. 91] Even though the U.S. has taken some significant
measures in developing a stronger energy policy since the devastating oil embargo
of 1973, we are and will continue to be very dependent on Persian Gulf oil well into
the 21st century. Our allies in Europe and in Japan will also have a very strong
interest in this area as they will import upwards from eighty percent of their
requirements from the area. Another embargo or even worse yet, the takeover of
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the oil fields by a hostile regime could prove devastating to the West. We must
have solid policies in place to prevent this from happening.
The biggest threat to this region albeit the most unlikely is the Soviet
Union. If the Soviets were to disrupt the flow of oil and capture a sizeable part of
the huge cash flow the Gulf generates, the balance of power would shift in their
favor. They have always regarded this area of the world as critical to their national
security, and have a strategic advantage by virtue of its geographical proximity to the
gulf. With a much more capable airlift and access to better airfields, it is not
unthinkable for them to put a large amount of forces on the ground rapidly before
we would have adequate time to block them.
The Arab-Israeli conflict will continue to provide the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) and other radical islamic factions incentive for
terrorist acts against Israeli and U.S. interests. The U.S. will support a sovereign
Israel. Israel has strong historical ties to this region and will not give up the land
they have fought for. Giving up the Golan heights, West Bank, and the Gaza strip
will jeopardize Israeli security. These ties go all the way back when God divided the
land between the twelve tribes of Jacob. If anything, the Israelis believe they have
rights to more land then they presently occupy. Much of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan
once belonged to the Jewish people.
The Arab frustration with Israel will be vented against not only Israel but
also the U.S. who will be Israel's main supporter. Terrorism will continue to reign
in that area with U.S. interests targeted. The oil industry will be at risk. American
citizens in country and abroad will be potential targets. Further efforts will be made
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to establish terrorist activity in the U.S. The U.S. will find itself in unenviable
positions as it supports Israel.
Another threat which will create instability in the region will be the war
between Iran and Iraq. Both nations will find their patience wearing thin with each
other and inevitably end up in war. Religious differences, territorial disputes,
navigational rights along with intense bitterness from the last war will be the kindle
which starts the fire. In the year 2000 both nations will have highly lethal weapons
including nuclear weapons. The threat of escalation will have to be reckoned with.
U.S. interests- primarily the secure access of oil will be in jeopardy.
The Persian Gulf will be one of the most unstable regions of the world.
The Arab-Israeli conflict will provide the fuel for further tensions. Several of the
Middle East nations will be led by radical factions of the Islamic faith. As we have
seen in the past, it is not uncommon for them to sacrifice lives including their own
for their cause. This trend will continue in the future. The problem grows larger
as these radical nations obtain highly lethal munitions including nuclear weapons.
The U.S. military may be called on to secure access to the oil supply and protect
other U.S. interests in the region. The level of conflict in all likelihood will be low.
Ballistic missile proliferation which will be a problem in the Persian Gulf as well as
in other areas will be examined next.
4. Ballistic Missile Proliferation
The global proliferation of ballistic missiles in volatile regions such as the
Middle East, South America and South Asia will be one of the more frightening
threats the U.S. will contend with in the 21st century. Central Intelligence Agency
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director William Webster has testified openly to Congress that more than 15
developing nations will be producing their own ballistic missiles within the next
decade. [Ref 45:p. 44] In Discriminate Deterrence, the commission reported that
forty or more countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere will have
the technical wherewithal to build arsenals of nuclear weapons within a few years.
[Ref 43:p. 10]
Presently, technology which can be used for both peaceful space launches
as well as ballistic missiles is being exported to a growing number of countries,
including those known to have committed acts of terrorism. Several European
companies are known to have provided equipment and technical assistance to Third
World ballistic missile programs. Because of the increase of nuclear power plants
across the globe, many countries are in possession of fissile material or have the
means to produce it. This creates a potential for the development of atomic bombs
by many poorer Third World countries.
This phenomena will have a great impact on the balance of power. No
longer will the U.S. and the Soviet Union have a monopoly on highly accurate
strategic weapons. No longer will these two powers dictate the flow of arms. China
is now the number two exporter of short range tactical ballistic missiles behind the
Soviet Union. Many lesser powers will have sizable arsenals including chemical
weapons and short-range or even medium-range missiles. [Ref 43:p. 9] These lethal
arsenals will prove to make it much more riskier and difficult for the superpowers
to intervene in regional conflicts. More cooperation and diplomacy will be required
to resolve tensions in many Third World countries.
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The main cause of this explosive spread of high-tech weapons is their
successful use in the Iran-Iraq War. [Ref 46:p. 40] Many Third World countries
watched this war closely and saw the effect that ballistic missiles had on the outcome
of the war. This war also showed that less developed countries had the capability
to use modern weaponry and be effective. Despite some heavy losses, Iraq emerged
as the victor largely in part to ballistic missiles. Today, Iraq has one of the largest
ballistic missile arsenals in the Middle East and a robust missile development
program [Ref 46:p. 43].
The Soviets continue to be the major exporter of these deadly weapons.
Most of the Third World countries were introduced to this technology by the Soviets.
The Soviets have transferred their new and more accurate SS-21 missile (120
kilometers) to Syria, North Yemen, South Yemen, and possibly Libya. [Ref 47:p. 17-
18] Other countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Egypt have entered this lucrative
market. Many of these nations are burdened with debt, so the sale of ballistic
missiles brings much needed hard currency. The oil-producing nations are the best
prospects for purchases because they have the hard currency to spend. India and
Pakistan are in a missile race. This race will create further instability in that region.
U.S. forces operating in the Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, and off of
North Africa and South Asia will be in the range of many Third World missiles.
Many of our overseas bases will be vulnerable to such attacks. Nations such as
Libya, Syria and Iraq will pose the greatest threats. These threats are not without
merit, Libya has already fired missiles at a U.S. communications base on the Italian
island of Lampedusa. Fortunately their missiles fell short, however we may not be
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so lucky in the future as they get their hands on more advanced systems. Forward-
deployed ships and those with prepositioned supplies for U.S. forces will be sitting
ducks for missiles with adequate range and accuracy. [Ref 46:p. 52]
Israel, our strongest ally in the Middle East will be subject to short and
medium range ballistic missiles on many fronts. Missiles from Syria, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and Libya will be well within striking distance of Tel Aviv. Many of
these missiles will be armed with chemical weapon warheads, and possibly nuclear
warheads. As these weapons come into the hands of radical Islamic regimes, a
Arab-Israeli war could prove to be a holocaust.
Ballistic missile technology in the hands of many unstable Third World
nations will prove to be one of the most dangerous threats the U.S. will face in the
years ahead. The acquiring of nuclear weapons by these countries will give them
leverage over existing nuclear powers. It will be much more difficult for us or the
Soviet Union to intervene in regional conflicts. The further escalation of these
weapons will be a great problem our country will face in the future.
5. Instability as a Threat
One of the basic problems the strategic planner faces is uncertainty in the
future environment. This uncertainty is a result of inadequate knowledge and
excessive complexity within the environment under scrutiny. Woven within that
uncertainty is instability. Instability is a dangerous threat which is difficult to
ascertain. The aforementioned threats have a good likelihood of surfacing based on
present conditions and trends. But what about those threats that one cannot predict
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and falls within the category of exogenous events which are random, uncontrollable,
or unpredictable.
Trying to predict Central Europe five even one year from now is difficult.
Events are moving rapidly. No longer is it clear who are enemies are. Can we
depend on the Warsaw Pact countries who are changing colors to a more democratic
society to support a Soviet invasion into Germany? Will a unified Germany be
neutral or will they be a NATO ally? Even though the changing conditions in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are favorable to our interests it creates havoc
in trying to plan for the future. It is a much more stable environment when we
know precisely where the threat is, as in the cold war days. This trend of volatility
and instability in the threat environment is going to continue in the years ahead.
Strategic planners must bear this in mind and make the most of it.
D. SUMMARY
The first decade of the new millennium will be a very different world than we
see today. No longer will the U.S. and Soviet Union dominate the globe. Many
new powers such as Japan, China, and India will emerge sharing that power. The
U.S. will continue to lead the world economy, but our edge will decrease further
with Japan and China closing in. America's national interests will be somewhat
diffei ent. Our focus will be directed inward as we try to tackle problems like AIDS,
drugs, the national debt, and care for the increased elderly population. With a less
threatening Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the U.S. military will find itself a much
smaller force. Much of the funds used for the military will be diverted to solve the
many domestic problems our nation will face.
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The Soviets will be a much more benign threat, however, they will not cease
from strategic modernization and the implementation of advance technology in their
military organization. Threats on different fronts will pose the greatest threat to
American interests and will be a great source of irritation. The U.S. military will
find itself more involved in the drug wars. The Persian Gulf will be a great area of
volatility and instability - a breeding ground for low intensity conflict. The
proliferation of ballistic missile technology and nuclear warheads will be the most
frightening threat this nation will have to face. Instability in the environment will
add complexity to the threat. Our interests and these emerging threats will paint the
posture of our military in the next two decades. Command and Control systems will
be a very integral part of tomorrow's military. The next chapter will explore the
type of C2 systems technology our military should pursue.
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VI. THE FUTURE FORCE AND C2 SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
The perception of future threats to national security will dictate the resources
applied to defense. This will in turn structure the posture of future military forces.
This chapter will examine the character of the future U.S. military. The threat and
resources along with emerging technology will be the key determinants in this future
military. These determinants will impact size, weaponry, tactics, and the
organization. Secondly, future C2 systems technology will be recommended as
solutions to the threat within the parameters of the future force.
With an apparent diminishing Soviet threat and growing internal social
problems, the U.S. military will find itself with reduced defense budgets. More and
more of the federal budget will be apportioned to those internal problems that are
new threats to national security such as drugs, AIDS, crime, and care for the large
elderly population. Small negative growth in the defense budget with the most
optimistic projection of zero percent growth will be expected in the next two
decades. Congress has repeatedly demonstrated that in the absence of a crisis it is
prone to cut back on defense- and then to spend heavily when the next crisis comes
along [Ref 43:p. 58].
66
B. FUTURE U.S. MILITARY FORCE
1. Size
The U.S. military in the year 2000 will be smaller than the one in 1990.
The corporate world and government service will be competing with the military in
acquiring sharper technically-oriented talent. The U.S. will find itself having a
difficult time acquiring volunteers in the dwindling category of 17-21 year old males.
The future force will require a much more technically competent soldier. With
decreased defense budgets and less people eligible for military service, the military
will find itself evolving into a much smaller force emphasizing greater flexibility.
Brigades will, in most cases, replace divisions as major maneuver groups,
although divisions will remain as resource centers. [Ref 48:p. 15] The trend will be
towards a more fully equipped reserve force to compliment the active force. The
effectiveness of the active 21st century force will be improved, principally, by late
20th century technological achievements in mobility, weapons, and communications
as well as by new concepts for land, sea, air, and space combat. [Ref 49:p. 7] The
military will be a much lighter, rapidly deployable force relying heavily on high
technology weapons.
2. Weapons/Technology
Even with constrained budgets, the trend is going to be towards high
technology initiatives. The Air Force will continue to be committed to high
technology as the touchstone of combat capability ...even under increasing budgetary
duress. [Ref 50:p. 47] Air Force Systems Command has come up with some future
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concepts beyond the turn of the century which include "robotic air vehicles,
automated attack systems, advanced air superiority missiles, high-altitude long
endurance vehicles, laser communications systems, high-power microwave weapons,
and stealthy transport airplanes." [Ref 5 1:p. 32]
Weaponry will be much "smarter", that is, able to apply damage in a much
more discriminate fashion minimizing collateral damage to civilians. Directed
energy weapons utilizing high-power microwaves and lasers will begin to enter the
inventories in the first decade of the new millennium. Guidance systems will
become so accurate within the next twenty years as to make strategic weapons armed
with conventional ordinance an attractive option. [Ref 52:p. 11-13]
The use of space will be an integral part of tomorrow's military. Many
new technologies will be offshoots of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This
author projects a partial strategic shield will be in place early in the 21st century.
Cheaper satellites will be available to place in space in a short notice. These satel-
lites will be used to replace some of the communication and intelligence gathering
functions accomplished by overseas bases. New space technology as well as advances
in other fields will guide the strategy and force structure of tomorrow. Much of this
new technology will be tied to greater advances in computer technology.
3. Tactics/Organization
With new threats appearing on many different fronts coupled with
advanced weaponry in the hands of smaller hostile forces, the U.S. military will
place increased emphasis in training for the range of conflict in the middle to low
intensity level. This will in turn affect tactics and organization. The future force will
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be professionally well-trained and -equipped and capable of countering threats over
the entire conflict spectrum and defeating, as appropriate, an adversary almost
anywhere in earth and space [Ref 49:p. 12].
The requirement to be able to deploy and strike quickly will be dependent
on advanced intelligence, target acquisition, and survcillance technology. The future
battlefield will be characterized by a higher degree of complexity and uncertainty
and will afford greater opportunity for officers at lower levels to make tactical
decisions. Even though future command and control systems will provide the
capability to put the rear commander in the foxhole, it is more likely that command
will become more decentralized to account for the increased uncertainty and
complexity.
Lighter military organizations will be dependent on accurate munitions,
timely intelligence, and effective C2 systems. Joint operations will be the approach
to most missions. With increased speed and longer range weapons, the battlefield
will become much smaller. This will require a greater integration of tactics between
all the services. Hence, the division between services to will become less and less
as we move to a more purple suit (joint) mentality in the next two decades. Special
operations forces will become much more important in the future as we deal with
contingencies such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other forms of LIC.
4. Other Considerations
Our military strategy which rests on the forward deployment of troops
ready to oppose invading armies and backed by strong reserves will be hard to
implement. This will arise from our difficulty of obtaining agreement for overseas
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bases and overflight rights. Fewer resources will be available for U.S. security
assistance programs. Moreover, this coupled with increased nationalism by many
Third World nations will result in increased tensions and a more unstable
environment.
U.S. community infrastructures (economies, politics, demographics,
resources, and others) will inhibit military stationing requirements and installation
activities and investments. [Ref 35 :p. 31] Communities which once derived their
economic welfare from military bases will have diversified their economies and
become less dependent on the military base for economic benefit. Furthermore,
with a more environmentally oriented populace, the military will find itself in a more
adverserial relationship with the local communities when it comes to base expansion
and military exercises.
The state of the economy, emerging technology, demographic trends, the
rise of nationalism in the Third World, and public attitudes toward the U.S. military
will have a considerable influence in shaping tomorrow's military. Some will have
more influence than others. It is imperative that today's planners take these factors
into account and harness both the positive and negative to develop the strongest
force possible. The 21st century force will be smaller and more reliant on C2
systems to take up the slack. With budget constraints, C2 systems will need to be
developed than can be functional in the most likely threat environments. The next
section will address this issue.
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C. FUTURE C2 SYSTEMS
C2 systems are developed to support a specific force under anticipated battle
conditions. The organization, mission, resources, and the threat are the parameters
in which the C2 system is designed. The 21st century military organization will be
more technology oriented rather than manpower intensive. Missions will be more
joint oriented utilizing resources from all the services. Resources will be
constrained, so the military will have to learn to get by on less. The final variable
in the equation- the threat, will be multi-faceted.
Systems which support the defense of Europe against a Soviet attack should
continue to be upgraded. This threat, though diminished will not go away. Strategic
C2 systems supporting our nuclear systems should also be upgraded. However,
increased attention should be given to the more likely threats outlined in the
previous chapter. C2 systems will be an integral part in responding to drug
trafficking, LIC in the Persian Gulf, and ballistic missile proliferation. This next
section identifies those technologies which we should pursue to meet those threats.
1. Narcotics Trafficking
The best way to eliminate narcotics trafficking is to curb demand. The
drug cartels rely heavily on the laws of supply and demand. President Barco of
Columbia challenged President Bush at the recent drug summit to go to the heart
of the problem by taking every action necessary to fight demand in the U.S.
Although the U.S. government is on an extensive campaign to reduce demand,
demand for illegal narcotics will continue in the next two decades. Other strategies
must be developed.
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The U.S. will find it very difficult to use military intervention in these
Latin American countries to combat the drug problem. With the recent invasion in
Panama, and rising nationalism, the Latin American countries are very sensitive
about any military action by the U.S. However, the U.S. military will be called on
to use some of its high-technology equipment to assist the civilian agencies in this
effort. Because of the large DOD budget for R&D in comparison to the other
civilian agencies, many defense oriented technologies can be applied to the drug war,
especially in communications and information processing. Several ways the U.S. can
go head on with this problem is by interdiction, going after narcofunding, and
clamping down on precursor chemicals used in making the narcotics.
The best place to interdict would be at the processing plants where the
illegal narcotics are manufactured. This would have to be accomplished by national
police and security forces. The U.S. could provide bio-mechanical sensor technology
which utilizes miniature mechanical devices built into silicon chips by photo-
lithographic and anisotropic etching processes. This technology which should come
to fruition by the 21st century could be used to sense (detect) the illegal narcotics
at these hidden processing plants.
Narcotics processing centers are very dependent upon air support. A
strategy that also aimed at gaining and maintaining superiority over contiguous air
space could inflict severe damage upon the narcotraffickers. [Ref 42:p. 69] The
U.S. could assist the nationals with increased surveillance by providing a netted-
radar environment to establish control over its airspace. This information then could
be linked down to local command centers as well as U.S. command centers. This
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linkage could be provided by new Light Satellite (LIGHTSAT) technology. [Ref
42:p. 69] LIGHTSATs are much smaller, cheaper, and can be put into orbit quickly.
LIGHTSATs would provide secure communications and sensor readout to the key
decision makers in the drug producing countries. This would also alert U.S. officials
of possible smuggling along the borders.
Secure communications is a must if this war is to be waged successfully.
The U.S. government has provided the enemy with large amounts of intelligence and
operational information through the use of unsecured communications. [Ref 41:p.
31] The drug cartels have invested heavily in SIGINT technology and equipment.
This capability has frustrated U.S. backed local efforts to locate them. More money
should be spent first to secure U.S. and U.S. backed agents communication, both
voice and data, and second, to increase the agents capability to intercept the drug
traffickers communication. The U.S. military has heavily invested in communications
security (COMSEC) technology and continues to upgrade it. They could provide the
appropriate equipment, logistics, and training if necessary.
Timely intelligence is critical to diffuse the extensive operations of the
drug traffickers. Fundamental to gathering effective intelligence is the ability to
process enormous amounts of information quickly. To aid the intelligence
commur,y, the U.S. should continue to pursue "advanced information-processing
systems enabling us and our friends to store, sort, retrieve, and collate enormous
amounts of data" [Ref 42:p. 72] about drug traffickers. Present systems are
fragmented at best and do not provide the necessary intelligence to keep drug agents
one step ahead of the traffickers. The fusion of information is key to success.
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Fusing information from human-, communications-, electronic-, imagery- and photo-
intelligence sources will provide a much clearer picture of the threat. The U.S.
military continues to fund extensive intelligence fusion programs. Expertise and
technology in this area could aid the war on drugs.
Integrating all these technologies into a functional system is the difficult
part of the equation. Making sure the right information gets to the right person at
the right time is the goal of any drug C2 system. Integrating military assets with
other drug agencies, both U.S. and foreign without compromising security will
require a systems engineering methodology. This will require extensive coordination
between all agencies. The U.S. military will have a lot to offer by way of
surveillance, sensor, and computer processing technology. These technologies should
be pursued by the military and integrated into the war on drugs. Much of what can
be used in the drug war will also be functional in other areas of LIC especially
terrorism.
2. LIC in the Persian Gulf
LIC in the Persian Gulf region- one of the most likely threats that may
require some type of U.S. military intervention poses several strategic constraints.
The great distance and geopolitical factors present time and space limitations on
military deployment. Further compound this with the fact that there exists a limited
C2 or intelligence infrastructure in this region, and the U.S. is faced with a strategic
dilemma. How do we communicate within this theater? Advanced technologies for
command, control, communications, intelligence, and training will offer us more
effective ways to cope with LIC and to help Third World friends [Ref 42:p. 71].
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U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has responsibility for this volatile
area. Presently, all operations in the Persian Gulf are sustained through the
Commander, Joint Task Force, Middle East (CJTFME). The majority of voice and
data connectivity with CENTCOM headquarters is on-board the CJTFME command
ship. The challenge is to provide high-capacity, secure and reliable communications
from multiple shore entry points to the command ship [Ref 53:p. 50].
Some of the more likely scenarios that the U.S. may face in this region in
the years to come include: terrorism against U.S. citizens and property including
hostage taking, attempted coups against U.S. friendly governments, military
assistance to Israel, and defense against ballistic missile attack on U.S. military
assets. It is within the plausibility of these threats that we should plan future C2
systems taking into account the limited C2 infrastructure in this region.
The first thing which should be done is the creating of a robust,
survivable, theater-wide communications capability in this region. The Defense
Communications Agency (DCA) is presently taking initiative to fill this void by
developing a "mixture of fixed and tactical, transportable communications equipment
organized into three major and minor nodes. [Ref 53:p. 51] This will enable
commands within the area to be tied into the Defense Communications System
(DCS) providing voice and data circuits to CENTCOM headquarters and the
National Command Authorities (NCA). This entry in the DCS will be accomplished
through terrestrial, HF radio, and satellite mediums.
To enhance DCA's initiative, several other technologies should be pursued
to create a more robust C2 infrastructure and provide better responsiveness to the
75
most likely future threats. Because of the large amount of terrorist activity in this
region, the U.S. should pursue the development of a "network of sensors and
information processors that will monitor the activities of hostile groups or individuals
and provide for the security of friends." [Ref 42:p. 73] During the next twenty
years, the use of smart electronic cards for reliable identification of individuals and
vehicles, as well as for on-person medical, training, financial, and other records, may
become pervasive. [Ref 42:p. 73] Integrating these sensors with advanced
information-processing systems may provide timely intelligence of terrorist activity
and serve as an effective deterrent.
Continuous, wide-area surveillance is one of the most important
capabilities that the U.S. could bring to bear in a LIC. [Ref 5 4 :p. 30] Surveillance
includes a myriad of activities from active radar detection which tracks ship and
aircraft movements, to locating enemy forces or terrorists and their associated
command centers. Surveillance would provide timely tactical intelligence. Several
systems which should be pursued to provide this surveillance include: "low-cost space
systems, long-endurance airships and aircraft, and robotic reconnaissance vehicles
that allow day and night monitoring of large areas, regardless of weather or terrain."
[Ref 42:p. 72] With advances in communications, sensors, airframe and engine
technology it is feasible to produce a long range airborne vehicle which could serve
in reconnaissance and communications relay roles. One drawback to this technology
would be the vulnerability to missile attack.
LIGHTSAT technology would be appropriate in this region to combat
LIC. One characteristic of these LIGHTSATs especially attractive for LIC is that
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they could be put under the direct control of the on-scene commander, and have the
data read out directly to him using low-cost, transportable ground stations. [Ref
54:p. 34j LIGHTSATs could provide secure intelligence and be integrated with t1,e
appropriate sensor systems. Also, information could be passed between unmanned
vehicles and airships to the ground using these satellites as relays. They can be
quickly placed in space without a heavy booster. One drawback is the longevity of
the LIGHTSAT. However, in all likelihood they would be used for selected
contingencies.
Utilizing the advances in sensor, surveillance, satellite, and airship
technology can enhance the proposed DCS infrastructure upgrade. In this area of
the world, intelligence is the precious commodity. Being one step ahead of the
terrorist or enemy could provide the U.S. the ability to preempt an attack through
other than military means. Effective intelligence systems will be a key factor in
creating a more stable environment in the Persian Gulf.
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3. Ballistic Missile Proliferation
The proliferation of ballistic missiles will be seen at strategic and tactical
ievels with most of the activity in tactical ballistic missile inventories which are
shorter in range. These short range ballistic missiles will continue to be available
in Third World nations which are not covered in force or missile reduction talks.
To defend against both strategic and tactical missiles and minimize the threat, effort
is being made to implement active defenses. The Joint Tactical Missile Defense
(JTMD) management office in Huntsville, Alabama, is taking the initiative for
tactical missile defenses, while the SDI program is providing the framework for
strategic defenses. Both efforts rely heavily on C2 systems.
A tactical missile defense special task force identified four conceptual
tactical missile defense operational elements:
* Active defense to destroy tactical missiles in flight, thus preventing successful
attacks against critical resources and adding uncertainty to enemy planning.
" Passive defense measures to degrade the enemy's ability to target U.S. and
allied forces, to reduce vulnerability to an enemy attack and to reconstitute and
recover the capability to conduct combat operations following an attack.
" Attack operations to destroy and disrupt tactical missile launch platforms and
their supporting command and control (C2) and logistic structures, thus
precluding or degrading enemy launch operations.
" C31 for tactical missile defense operations to coordinate and integrate the
exercise of authority and direction by commanders over forces assigned missile
defense tasks. [Ref 55:p. 45]
The C3I system is seen as the force multiplier for the tactical missile
defense operations by virtue of its ability to synergistically increase the combat worth
78
of missile defense to a value greater than the sum of the individual elements. This
force multiplier characteristic of C31 is essential to the operational concepts of
fighting and winning the short-range ballistic missile threat anywhere in the world
[Ref 55 :p. 45].
The C31 system supporting tactical missile defense operations can be
broken into three major components. A network of sensors utilizing IMINT,
SIGINT, and other national assets; C2 nodes where intelligence data from the
sensors is integrated with other intelligence data from battlefield areas; and the
communications systems which provide data distribution between weapons control-
lers, the sensor network and the C2 nodes. Current C3I systems supporting missile
defenses are not enduring. They are inflexible, vulnerable to single point failures,
easily targeted, and lack the capability to disseminate data in support of C2 opera-
tions in a semi-automated or automated system [Ref 55:p. 47].
Several areas should be pursued to create a more robust, flexible C2
system supporting tactical missile defenses. Sensor systems should be upgraded
incorporating the latest state of the art technology. Fusion centers need to be
developed which will take advantage of the large amounts of intelligence from
various sensors and integrate them into a coherent picture of the threat. More
emphasis should be placed on secure, jam-resistant multinodal distribution systems
which will prevent system failure should one node be knocked out. Finally, general
communications systems capabilities supporting missile defenses should be integrated
networks capable of voice, data, graphics and imagery traffic that is transparent to
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the user. [Ref 55:p. 47] The evolving Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)
technology should be exploited for missile defense applications.
At the strategic level, the SDI program is addressing missile defenses.
The goal of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) is "to conduct a vigorous
research and technology development program that could help to eliminate the
threat of ballistic missiles and provide increased U.S. and allied security. [Ref 56:p.
11-13] Long-range ballistic missiles pose the greatest danger to the Continental
United States (CONUS). The SDIO is attempting to ameliorate that threat.
Fundamental to successful strategic defense is C2. The appropriate
terminology for C2 in the SDI program is Battle Management/Command, Control,
and Communications or BM/C3. The key technologies that make up the BM/C3
system are processors, software, networks, communications, and man-machine
interface/decision aids. One study indicated that much of the technology required
to implement the fundamental requirements of SDI BM/C3 either exists in a
developed state or is nearing development [Ref 57:p. xiii].
Processor technology is a critical area which should take advantage of the
advances in chip manufacturing. A key factor in the development of processors for
SDI will be security. Software will prove to be the long pole in fielding an adequate
defense shield. The increasing complexity of SDI will require advancements in
software technology beyond what is available today. [Ref 14:p. xvi] Advanced
network topology and routing will have to be developed to sustain the large amount
of space, airborne and ground based elements in the SDI system. The design of
communications mediums must emphasize speed; protection against jamming,
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nuclear radiation and direct attack; and high signal to noise ratios. Of even greater
importance, SDI BM/C3 must be evolved together with the complete SDI
architecture to capture the strengths of evolving BM/C3 technology and to avoid
weaknesses inherent in complexity, which can result if system design decisions do not
fully take into account the impact on BM/C3 [Ref 57:p. xiii].
D. SUMMARY
The U.S. military at the beginning of the 21st century will be lighter, more
mobile and expected to respond to conflict at all ranges of the spectrum. U.S.
strategy will seek to maximize technological advantages. [Ref 43:p. 21] Joint
operations will be more commonplace. Weapons will be smarter and much more
accurate; thus, shrinking the battlefield. More weight will be placed on intelligence,
reconnaissance, and C2 to account for the smaller forces.
To combat narcotics trafficking and other forms of LIC, C2 systems should be
built around advanced sensor, and information processing technologies. The fusion
of large amounts of information will be required to give a clear picture of the threat.
Effort should continue to be expended in LIGHTSAT and airship technology to
increase flexibility and surveillance capability. The military must continue to develop
ballistic missile defenses against both the tactical and strategic threat. The SDI
program should continue to be funded. Many new technologies will be offshoots of
this program and will be used in other military applications.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Command and Control (C2) systems are designed to enable a commander to
plan, direct, and control the operations of his forces in accordance with the assigned
mission. The C2 system has many components among which include
communications, procedures, and personnel. These components are integrated into
an effective architecture for the sole purpose of supporting the commander in
meeting his mission. If the architecture is deficient in meeting the goals and
objectives of the mission, then a requirement must be established to satisfy the
deficiency.
Requirements must be balanced among resources, technology, and the mission.
It is difficult to develop good requirements and identify solutions because of the
constant changes in resources, technology, and mission. Resources change year to
year depending on the whim of Congress. Engineers are constantly pushing
technology to the limits to come up with the best black box. The mission continues
to change as the threat changes. The challenge at hand is to harness these changes
to a constructive end.
Strategic planning provides a systematic approach to guiding the constant
change of the C2 systems requirements process. The fundamental components of
strategic planning include interests, future environment, resources, and strategy.
There is a logical progression from the highest levels (interests) down to the level
this thesis is concerned with (what type of C2 systems technology should be pursued)
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that a C2 system planner can follow by utilizing the strategic planning components
in some type of strategic planning model.
The first thing which is accomplished is the establishing of interests. This is
not in the domain of the C2 system planner. The second step is to project
alternative future environments which include threats to national security, both
military and non-military. Once the most plausible future environments (threats) are
identified, the next step is to project the interests on the future environment to
develop a national strategy. The national strategy will be made up of many
components including a military strategy. The military strategy will then be further
broken down into specific missions. The final step is to determine what type of C2
system will be required to satisfy the demands of the mission. This whole process
is within the confines of the available resources.
One of the key determinants of the military's future mission and the C2
systems that support it, is the future threat. The threat in the year 2000 will be
different than in 1990. The Soviet Union will remain our most formidable foe,
however they will not present the greatest threat to our national security. New
threats have emerged and will continue to pose problems to our national security
and military planners. The U.S. military will become increasingly involved in the
drug wars, being tasked to provide surveillance and interdiction assets. The Persian
Gulf will prove to be the international hotbed of terrorism and other forms of low
intensity conflict possibly requiring a U.S. military response. Ballistic missiles will
become available to many Third World nations jeopardizing American interests
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abroad. This will create a greater degree of instability and weaken the influential
hands of the major powers.
On the home-front, the defense budget will become smaller as more funding
will be put toward emerging social problems including AIDS, education, drugs, the
environment, and care for the elderly. This will force DOD to move towards a
lighter military more dependent on technology. C2 systems characterized as force
multipliers will become more significant as the military is asked to do more with
less.
The explosion in surveillance, sensor, and information processing technology
should be exploited for military applications in these new threat environments. This
technology should be incorporated into systems that can be functional in many threat
environments. Systems that are developed for NATO should be able to function in
IJC in the Persian Gulf. Fusion systems that are developed for integrating a picture
of the threat in Central Europe should be capable of assimilating data in the drug
wars to paint a picture of that threat. C2 systems developed for SDI should also be
functional in environments where shorter range ballistic missiles pose the greatest
danger.
Military planners must expand their view of the threat. This author strongly
agrees with the assessment of the threat given by the Commission on Integrated
Long-Term Strategy. We should emphasize a wider range of contingencies than the
two extreme threats that have long dominated our alliance policy and force planning:
the massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe and an all-out Soviet nuclear
attack. [Ref 43 :p. 2] Pentagon planners must continue the move toward a more
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mobile, versatile force capable of deterring aggression discriminately over a wide
range of attacks.
Those responsible for fielding the technology of tommorrow's C2 systems need
to be in concert with the changing face of the environment. Cognizant of the new
emerging threats on multiple fronts coupled with the reality of smaller defense
budgets, C2 system planners must make every effort to implement systems that will
be functional over a large spectrum of conflict. The future is shrouded in
uncertainty, but we must make every effort to manage that uncertainty as best as
possible. National security remains the protection of internal values from the
external threat. The major uncertainty of the future is that the threat has changed
and so must we.
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